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Comment: A New Approach to Regulatory Taking 
Analysis 
"Contrary to plaintiff's urging, nothing ... persuades us that the 
eminent domain action here is exempt from commerce clause 
analysis." 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The development of modern industry and transportation has stim-
ulated our nation's urbanization. Urbanization, however, creates nu-
merous public problems such as air and noise pollution, overcrowding, 
traffic congestion, and the destruction of scenic beauty. Many states, in 
an attempt to combat these problems, now recognize an increasing need 
for open-space lands. 2 
In the past, acquisition by eminent domain3 was the technique 
used by municipalities seeking to create open-space land. Unfortu-
nately, inefficiency of contractual tax incentives" and difficulties with 
1. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 174 Cal. App. 3d 414,419 n.2., 220 Cal. Rptr. 153, 
156 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). For a detailed discussion of the Raiders line of casses see this issue, 
Note, City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders (Raiders IV): Commerce Clause Scrutiny As An End-
Run Around Traditional Public Use Analysis. 
2. E.g., Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 n.8 (1980). The City Council of Tiburon found 
that "[i]t is in the public interest to avoid unnecessary conversion of open-space land to strictly 
urban uses, thereby protecting against the resultant adverse impacts, such as air, noise, and water 
pollution." California is one state which considers preservation of open-space land a necessity. See 
generally, CAL CoNST. art. XIII, § 8 (West Cum. Supp. 1981); CAL. Gov'T Com:§§ 65560 et 
seq. (West Cum. Supp. 1980). 
3. Taking cases were first reviewed under an eminent domain theory. Eminent domain is the 
power to take private property for public use by a state or any of its municipalities. Exercise of the 
eminent domain power almost always results in an enrichment to the government because the 
government transfers the landowner's rights to itself. 
4. Contracts giving special tax advantages to particular taxpayers are used by municipalities 
to acquire open space land. The underlying principles of this technique allow a municipality to 
restrict use of land for a minimum number of years in exchange for tax advantages given to the 
landowner. The contracts are difficult to break and are unaffected by sale or transfer of the prop-
erty or by the landowner's death. One example of these contracts is California Land Conservation 
Act, CAL. Gov'T CoDE§§ 51200-51295 (West Cum. Supp. 1981), and the Open Space Easement 
Act, CAL. Gov'T CODE§§ 51050-51097 (West Cum. Supp. 1981). 
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obtaining funds through tax increases11 have forced municipalities to de-
pend on police power regulation to control the use of land. 6 
Under the shield of their constitutionally granted police powers, 
municipalities have exercised considerable control over private prop-
erty. In many instances, the effect of this control is equivalent to a tak-
ing-the deprivation of private property for a public use without just 
compensation.7 When police powers are involved, the taking is called a 
"regulatory taking" because regulations for public use have the effect of 
depriving an individual of a specific use of his property. 
Courts are increasingly called upon to clarify the meaning of the 
term "regulatory taking." While the notion is straight forward in the-
ory, its application in practice has been troublesome; development of 
regulatory takings law has been complex and confusing.8 No clear test 
has emerged for determining when a regulation crosses the line from a 
permissible regulation to an unconstitutional taking. 
The plea for clarification comes from local governments as well as 
from landowners. Local governments are uncertain about the validity of 
their open-space ordinances and other zoning regulations. Landowners 
are faced with the uncertainty of not knowing whether the expected use 
of their land will be allowed because of present or future regulation. 
Additionally, landowners are unsure whether they can obtain compen-
sation when government restricts the use of their land. 
Despite the need for clarification, the Supreme Court's recent 
5. One example of tax increase difficulties is California's Proposition 13 (CAL CoNST. art. 
XIIIA (West Cum. Supp. 1980)) which reduced the amount of public revenue available to 
purchase open-space lands. Proposition 13 has four major provisions: A 1% limit on property tax 
revenues; limitations on assessments; voter approval requirements for future tax increases by the 
state government; and voter approval requirements for future local government tax increases. CAL. 
ASSEMBLY COMM. ON LOCAL Gov'T, THE IMPACT OF PROPOSITION 13 (THE jARVIS-GANN 
INITIATIVE) ON LOCAL GoV'T SERVICES AND fACILITIES 12 (1978). 
6. Police power regulation is the authority delegated to local governments by the tenth 
amendment of the United States Constitution. Local governments are thus enabled to adopt such 
laws and regulations as tend to secure generally the comfort, safety, riwrals and health of their 
citizens. Under police power regulation the state is not enriched because there is no transfer of 
rights. 
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person shall ... be deprived ... of property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." 
8. See, generally, Bauman, The Supreme Court, Inverse Condemnation and the Fifth 
Amendment: justice Brennan Confronts the Inevitable in Land Use Controls, 15 RuTGERS L.J. 
15 (1983); Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accomodation Power: Antidotes for the Tak-
ing Impasses in Land Use Controversies, 75 CoLUM. L. REv. 1021 (1975); Dunham, Griggs v. 
Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 SuP. 
CT. REv. 63; Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations 
of 'Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967); Sax, Taking, Private Property 
and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, And Due Proress. 
37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1057 (1980); Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by the Polire Power: 
The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. I (1971). 
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opinions9 have done little to clear the muddied waters created by earlier 
United States Supreme Court decisions such as Mugler v. Kansas, 10 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 11 and Penn Central Transportation 
Co. v. New York City. 12 Consequently, it is essential that the Supreme 
Court take steps to develop an adequate, workable test for deciding 
when police-power regulation becomes a taking. 
This comment analyzes the weaknesses of both past and present 
tests for determining when governmental regulation effects a taking of 
private property, and recommends an alternative approach similar to 
dormant commerce clause analysis announced by the United States Su-
preme Court. 13 
II. TAKINGS TESTS HAVE BEEN TROUBLESOME BECAUSE OF 
INCONSISTENCIES WITHIN THE TESTS 
A. The Traditional Takings Tests 
The Supreme Court has applied several tests when deciding 
whether governmental actions have amounted to "takings" of private 
property. These tests include physical invasion, public nuisance, dimi-
nution in value, and a combination of public nuisance and diminution 
in value. 
1. Physical invasion 
The physical invasion test14 is the traditional test and the easiest to 
apply. Historically, however, the concept provided little protection to 
landowners. Under the physical invasion test, a taking required an ab-
solute appropriation and dispossession of the owner's land. Later, the 
Supreme Court decided that an absolute appropriation was not neces-
9. E.g., MacDonald. Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986); Williamson 
County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985); 
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 
(1980). 
10. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
II. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
12. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
13. U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3: "The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Com-
merce ... among the several States." The dormant commerce clause comes into play when Con-
gress has not exercised the federal commerce clause (art. I, § 8, cl.3) to regulate certain areas of 
commerce. It prevents states from regulating or taxing in a way that would materially burden or 
discriminate against interstate commerce. 
14. The theory of physical invasion is discussed in greater detail infra., text accompanying 
notes 36-44 in connection with the Penn Central standard. 
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sary in order for a taking to occur-only a serious interruption to the 
common and necessary use of the property. 111 
2. Public nuisance 
The public nuisance test sprang out of common law nuisance 
cases. The test stresses the government's traditional power to terminate 
uses of land which are harmful to neighboring property or to the gen-
eral public.18 The case which best exemplifies the public nuisance doc-
trine is Mugler v. Kansas. 17 
In Mugler, the Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of a 
Kansas statute prohibiting the brewing of beer. Application of the stat-
ute forced Mugler to close his brewery. Writing for the majority, Jus-
tice Harlan explained that the statute was valid because Mugler's busi-
ness manufactured and sold liquor which the state considered to be a 
danger to the public's health, safety, and morals. Harlan stated that 
police power could be used to destroy the value of a person's property 
once the property is declared a public nuisance.18 
3. Diminution in value 
In the early twentieth century, paralleling the rise of modern in-
dustry and urban growth, courts began to recognize that the reach of 
regulatory takings was much broader than that allowed for by tradi-
tional theories of physical invasion and public nuisance. This height-
ened judical recognition of government's power to "take" lead to the 
Supreme Court's "diminution-in-value" theory. This theory is a corol-
lary to Justice Holmes's statement in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 
that " ... if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a tak-
ing."19 Justice Holmes argued that if diminution in economic value 
caused by regulation "goes too far," a compensatory taking exists. 
However, he left unanswered the question of how much diminution in 
value is required, i.e., how far is "too far." 20 
15. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 177-78 (1871) (compensable taking 
occurred when land was destroyed by government-caused flooding). 
16. E.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928) (cedar trees spawned a pest that 
would destroy nearby apple orchards). 
17. 123 u.s. 623 (1887). 
18. ld. at 667. 
19. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
20. See, R. Anderson, I AMERICAN LAW OF ZoNING, § 2.23 at 101 (1968). Because "too 
far" has no precise definition, a simple showing of pecuniary loss is no indication that a taking has 
occurred. This is demonstrated by the rather uneven course in the dollar-and-cents evidence used 
by the courts: "Examination of approximately 50 cases in which the courts mentioned proof of the 
value of the subject land if used for a permitted purpose, as compared with its value if used for a 
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4. The combination of public nuisance and diminution in value 
Today, the courts agree that diminution in value or some economic 
loss is a relevant factor, but such loss is not in itself decisive. Even 
though compensability under Holmes's theory depends on the amount 
or degree of harm the claimant sustains,21 a judicial finding that the 
state has validly exercised its police power often relieves the state of any 
duty to compensate the landowner, regardless of the degree of loss sus-
tained.22 This modern reading of the diminution in value theory results 
from the Supreme Court's gradual melding of Justice Harlan's public 
nuisance test in Mugler with Justice Holmes's "too-far" test in Mahon. 
The melding of Mugler and Mahon is most notable in a 1962 
Supreme Court decision concerning the question of whether a town, 
which by exercise of its police power had prohibited a sand and gravel 
operator from further excavations of property within the town limits, 
could be said to have taken private property. The Supreme Court held 
m Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead:23 
If this ordinance is otherwise a valid exerCise of the town's police 
powers, the fact that it deprives the property of its most beneficial use 
does not render it unconstitutional ... This is not to say, however, 
that governmental action in the form of regulation cannot be so oner-
ous as to constitute a taking which constitutionally requires a com-
pensation . . . There is no set formula to determine where regulation 
ends and taking begins. 2• 
Despite this dicta and notwithstanding the Mahon rule, the Court in 
Goldblatt held that a complete prohibition of benefical use was justified 
even though the landowner might suffer a severe pecuniary loss result-
ing from the governmental regulation. Thus the Supreme Court has 
paid lip service to the Mahon rule but in practice has adopted Mugler's 
harsh result. While Mugler and Mahon are ostensibly at odds with 
proposed purpose outlawed by the ordinance, revealed that about half of the ordinances were 
approved and half were found unconstitutional." !d. at 101. 
21. In one case, decided just four years after Mahon, the landowner's diminution in value 
was alleged to be seventy-five percent of the original value of the property. This was not enough to 
convince the court that a taking had occurred, however. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
22. See e.g. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262-63. But see, San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. 
San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981). 
23. 369 U.S. 590, 592-94 (1962). 
24. /d. at 592-94. 
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each other,211 certain of the current Supreme Court Justices advocate 
their use in tandem. 26 
B. The Present Takings Standard 
Between 1928 and 197 4, the Supreme Court decided only two reg-
ulatory taking cases: Berman v. Parker7 and Goldblatt. 28 Unfortu-
nately, these two cases did little to clarify the takings test29 voiced in 
previous Supreme Court decisions.30 In 1978, the Supreme Court 
handed down Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,31 
formulating the Supreme Court's present regulatory takings standard. 
The Supreme Court in Penn Central formulated a balancing 
standard with the following three factors: 32 1) What is the character of 
the governmental action;33 2) to what extent has value been dimin-
ished;34 and 3) to what extent has the regulation interfered with rea-
sonable expectations, specifically, distinct investment-backed expecta-
tions?311 
25. Mugler holds that no exercise of the police power is a taking. Mahon holds that an 
exercise of the police power is a taking if it goes too far. 
26. See, Dissenting opinion by Justices Renquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice 
Stevens. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The dissent 
attempts to propose a taking doctrine that accomodates both Mahon and Mugler. A regulation 
that destroys property rights amounts to a taking except when the regulation is necessary to pre-
vent the owner's using the land in a way injurious to the public health, safety, and morals; or 
when the restricted property covers a large area. 
27. 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (involves urban renewal). 
28. Goldblatt 369 U.S. at 590. 
29. Bauman, The Supreme Court, Inverse Condemnation and the Fifth Amendment: justice 
Brennan Confronts the Inevitable in Land Use Controls, 15 RuTGERS L.J. 15, 36-37 (1983). 
30. Cases reviewed by the Court in Penn Central include: Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 
369 U.S. 590 (1962); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 
260 U.S. 393 (1922); and Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
31. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). New York designated Penn Central Station as a "landmark" and 
denied its owner a permit to erect a building in excess of fifty stories on an arch above the station. 
The city's Landmarks Preservation Law allowed the owner to transfer the lost development right 
to certain other sites, thus permitting development that would have been excessive at the other site. 
Although the New York Court of Appeal treated the legal question as one of substantive due 
process and not eminent domain (See Penn Central 42 N.Y.2d 324, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914, 366 
N.E.2d 1271 (1977)) the Supreme Court analyzed the issue as one of police power taking. 438 
U.S. at 131-33. 
32. See, Bowden & Feldman, Take It or Leave It: Uncertain Regulatory Taking Standards 
and Remedies Threaten California's Open Space Planning, 15 U.C.D. L. REv. 371, 380 n.40 
(1981). Although Bowden and Feldman derive five standards, this comment chooses to focus on 
only three which apply to regulatory takings generally and not to regulations involving unique 
public functions. 
33. Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
34. ld. at 124. 
35. /d. at 124-25. 
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1. The governmental action 
Penn Central's first factor asks, "what character has the govern-
mental action assumed?" Governmental action can take two forms, 
physical invasion or regulation. 36 
a. Physical invasion 
Although proof of a physical invasion is not an absolute require-
ment, the Penn Central majority stated that a taking is more readily 
found when interference with property can be characterized as a physi-
cal invasion. However, by placing too much emphasis on the concept of 
physical invasion, courts often rule out any possibility that the exercise 
of police power regulation will constitute a taking. The concept of 
physical invasion, traditionally thought of as requiring an absolute ap-
propriation, is often associated with an element of eminent domain, i.e., 
that the landowner's property rights must transfer to the government.37 
Courts are often reluctant to find a "taking" unless some transfer of 
rights, express or implied, has occured. 38 
b. Regulation 
Police power regulation also diminishes a landowner's property 
rights. However, peculiar to such regulation, no property rights pass to 
the government. This theory accounts for the statement by the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego39 
that, "[u]nlike the person whose property is taken in eminent domain, 
the individual who is deprived of his property due to the state's exercise 
of its police power in not entitled to compensation."40 
Regulatory taking is also described as a negative restraint (as op-
posed to physical invasion, which is often described as an "affirmative 
action" by the government).41 However, use of terms like "affirmative" 
36. Justice Marshall in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhatten CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 
(1982), stated: "More recent cases confirm the distinction between a permanent physical occupa-
tion, a physical invasion short of an occupation, and a regulation that merely restricts the use of 
property." This indicates that land can be physically invaded or physically occupied. According to 
Loretto, only permanent physical occupation consititues a taking. The majority in Penn Central 
did not indicate whether they meant to include physical occupation as well as physical invasion as 
a possible characteristic. 
37. Eminent domain occurs only if certain events are present: There must be some activity by 
an entity having eminent domain power; the activity must diminish the landowner's property 
rights; and there must be a transfer of property rights from the landowner to the government. 
These factors flow naturally from the constitutional language that "private property shall not be 
taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
38. Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, And Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. RF.v. 1057, 
1084 (1980). 
39. 146 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1979), affd 450 U.S. 639 (1981). (81 Cal. App. 3d 844 has omitted 
the text of the case). 
40. /d. at 110. 
41. An example of an affirmitive physical invasion would be a condemnation action by the 
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and "negative" to distinguish when a taking occurs should be inconse-
quential. Justice Brennan made this point in his dissenting opinion in 
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego. 42 He stated that governmen-
tal encroachment, be it affirmative invasion or negative restraint, con-
stitutes a taking because the impact and effect upon the landowner is 
the same regardless of the nature of the situation.43 More often than 
not, however, the courts are reluctant to find a taking if the interference 
can only be characterized as a restraint. In practice, therefore, Penn 
Central's "nature of the governmental action" factor has been heavily 
skewed toward so called affirmative governmental action, i.e., eminent-
domain takings. 
2. To what extent has value been diminished 
The second factor of Penn Central is a restatement of the diminu-
tion in value theory announced in Mahon-a taking occurs when the 
regulation results in an unduly harsh impact upon a landowner's prop-
erty value. Recently the Supreme Court noted that a land ordinance 
will rarely deprive private land of all its use. The Supreme Court went 
on to intimate that if any use remains in the land at all, no taking has 
occurred.44 If this reasoning were taken literally, a landowner could 
never be compensated for a taking. A later case, however, casts doubt 
on this line of analysis. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart, 
Marshall, and Powell, stated in the dissenting opinion411 to San Diego 
Gas & Elec.: 
government for a public use (e.g., taking property to build a public highway). Similarly, land 
which is subsequently damaged by a public use or improvement of land would be an affirmative 
physical invasion (e.g., flooding of land due to the construction of a highway embankment without 
provisions for adequate drainage). 
42. 450 U.S. at 639. 
43. Police power regulations such as zoning ordinances and other land-use restrictions 
can destroy the use and enjoyment of property in order to promote the public good just 
as effectively as formal condemnation or physical invasion or property. From the prop-
erty owner's point of view, it may matter little whether his land is condemned or 
flooded, or whether it is restricted by regulation to use in its natural state, if the effect 
in both cases is to deprive him of all beneficial use of it. 
San Diego, 450 U.S. at 652. See also, Olson, The Role of "Fairness" in Establishing a Constitu-
tional Theory of Taking, 3 THE URBAN LAw. 440 (1971). 
44. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 259 n.6 (1980): The California Supreme Court found 
that "[t]he terms of the ordinance permit construction of one to five residence on the appellants' 5-
acre tract. The court therefore rejected the contention that the ordinance prevents all use of the 
land." 
45. Justice Rehnquist stated in his concurring opinion in San Diego that he "would have 
little difficulty in agreeing" with the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan if there had been no 
ripeness question in the case. San Diego, 450 U.S. at 643-35. Justice Rehnquist's vote would have 
made the dissent the majority opinion. 
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It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result if ... it shall be 
held that if government refrains from the absolute conversion of real 
property to the uses of the public it can destroy its value, entirely, can 
inflict irreparable and permanent injury to any extent. . . .46 
... It is only logical, then, that government action ... can be a 
"taking," ... where the effects [of the action] completely deprive the 
owner of all or most of his interest in the property."7 
407 
It would appear that Penn Central's second factor IS still one of 
degree.48 
3. To what extent have investment-backed expectations been 
diminished 
The focus of Penn Central's third factor is on interference with 
reasonable expectations-specifically, "distinct investment-backed ex-
pectations." However, as with diminution in value, the majority in 
Penn Central failed to define what an "investment-backed expectation" 
is. One year later, the Supreme Court again used the term in Andrus 
v. Allard, 49 but again failed to define the term. Soon after Allard the 
Supreme Court reformulated the language of Penn Central by replac-
ing "distinct investment-backed expectation" with "an owner['s] eco-
nomically viable use of his land."60 Some courts apply the Supreme 
Court's language by requiring a total absence of "economically viable 
use."61 Landowners rarely meet this difficult requirement because most 
land normally has varied uses. 
4. Summary 
Penn Central is a burdensome standard for landowners. The bur-
den of proof on the landowner to show a diminution in value or a loss 
of investment-backed expectations requires proof of absolute or near-
absolute appropriation and dispossession. The bottom line is that the 
Penn Central standard is no standard at all. 
46. /d. at 651 (quoting Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166, 177-78 (1972)). 
47. /d. 633. 
48. The "degree," however, has not been precisely defined by the Supreme Court, so the 
Court relies on an "ad hoc, factual inquiry" of previous decisions in takings cases. It should not be 
concluded that diminution of value is an irrelevant factor in takings cases. Despite the Agins 
language, courts still seek to determine whether the general welfare advanced by a particular land 
use regulation is proportional to the landowner's loss of all or substantially all the value of his 
land. 
49. 444 U.S. 51, 61 n.21 (1979). 
50. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260. 
51. E.g., Oceanic Cal., Inc. v. City of San Jose, 497 F. Supp. 962, 973 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (no 
taking found where some economic use of land remains). 
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III. USING COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS IN TAKING SITUATIONS 
Einstein is said to have remarked that "everything should be made 
as simple as possible, but not simpler."112 The simplest means for devel-
oping an adequate test is to employ a test (or its analysis) that has 
already proven effective. As an alternative to the current balancing test, 
this comment suggests that courts faced with regulatory takings claims 
should use the analysis developed by the Supreme Court when address-
ing dormant commerce clause claims. This comment proposes an adop-
tion of the dormant commerce clause analysis developed by the Su-
preme Court in Pike v. Bruce Church Inc. 53 
A. The Definition of the Dormant Commerce Clause 
The United States Constitution gives Congress the power to regu-
late commerce "among the several States."54 The Supreme Court's de-
cisions have interpreted this power to mean that Congress has power to 
regulate any activity which affects interstate commerce, including many 
intrastate activities. Thus, Congress has broad powers over commerce 
and uses these powers regularly to protect the general public from 
harm. However, the Constitution does not say what the states may or 
may not do in the absence of congressional action.55 Fortunately, the 
inclinations which have guided the Supreme Court's decisions occasion-
ally surface in its opinions. The Supreme Court's long line of cases 
indicate that the general proposition of the dormant commerce clause is 
that in the absence of Congressional action, the states are free to regu-
late as long as the regulation does not unduly burden interstate com-
merce. If state regulation unduly burdens interstate commerce, "the 
dormant commerce clause" steps in and bars the state action which has 
unduly burdened the interstate commerce. It was this power which the 
Supreme Court invoked in Pike. Subsequent cases have merely built on 
the Pike analysis. 
B. The Pike balancing test 
In Pike the Supreme Court dealt with an Arizona statute which 
required that all Arizona cantaloupes be packed in Arizona. Church, 
an Arizona cantaloupe grower, transported his melons to nearby Cali-
fornia facilities. When the melons were packed in California, they were 
52. Gayler, How lC1 Break the Momentum of the Nuclear Arms Race, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 
1982, §6 at 49. 
53. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
54. U.S. CoNST. art. I § 8, cl. 3. 
55. H.P. Hood & Sons v. Dumond, 336 U.S. 525, 534-35 (1949). 
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not identified as Arizona grown. The State's purpose for the statute 
was to enhance the reputation of Arizona's cantaloupes by prohibiting 
deceptive packaging. The Supreme Court found the State interest in 
enhancing its reputation was legitimate; however, the State's interest 
was outweighed by the natural interest in unencumbered commerce. 
"[T]he Courts have viewed with particular suspicion state statutes re-
quiring business operations to be performed in the home State that 
could more efficiently be performed elsewhere. Even where the State is 
pursuing a clearly legitimate local interest, this particular burden on 
commerce has been declared to be virtually per se illegal."56 From this 
holding, the Supreme Court formulated a three prong test: 1) is there a 
legitimate state interest; 2) is the regulation rationally related to a legit-
imate end; and 3) is the burden on interstate commerce incidental ?57 
Concise in its requirements, the Pike test is used without hesitation by 
the courts. 58 
C. Similarities Between Claims Requiring Dormant Commerce 
Clause Scrutiny and Regulatory Takings Claims 
Use of dormant commerce clause analysis in regulatory takings sit-
uations may appear novel. Upon closer examination, however, some 
similarities between claims requiring dormant commerce clause scru-
tiny and claims which invite traditional regulatory taking analysis are 
apparent. First, in both situations, the objective of government is to 
protect the general public. 59 Second, the power to regulate commerce 
and the power to regulate land use are constitutionally re-
56. Pike 397 U.S. at 145. 
57. /d. at 142. Justice Stewart stated for a unanimous Court the gerneral rule in commerce 
clause cases: "Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitmate local public inter-
est, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden 
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. If a legiti-
mate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree." 
58. This, no doubt, is because the Pike test reflects the Supreme Court's attempt in previous 
cases to balance the interests of the parties, the states and the federal government. With Pike, the 
Court progressed beyond Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 
How.) 299 (1851). The "direct-indirect" distinction, which was often a mechanical distinction, 
gave way to a more subtle balancing turning upon the weighing of relevant circumstances. Pike 
reflects both Southern Pacific and Barnwell's insistence on greater judical scrutiny. Finally, Pike 
alludes to Justice Cardozo's opinion in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935), 
when he addressed the issue of protectionism. Justice Cardozo said that the distinction made be-
tween direct and indirect burdens is "irrelevant when the avowed purpose of the obstruction, as 
well as its necessary tendency, is to suppress or mitigate the consequences of competition between 
the states." 294 U.S. 511 at 522. Pike is a succinct summary of the dormant commerce clause cases 
to date. 
59. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-/946, 59 HARV. L. 
REv. 645, 947 (1946); Feiler, Zoning: A Guide to judical Review, 47 J. URB. L. 319 (1969). 
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stricted-government's power to regulate is tempered with a corre-
sponding concern for individual rights.60 And third, both dormant com-
merce clause and regulatory taking analysis use the following standards 
to measure the constitutionality of state action: 1) Is the government 
regulation based upon a legitimate state interest; 2) is there a rational 
relation between this interest and the regulation; and 3) do the benefits 
from the regulation outweigh the burden imposed on individual 
interests ?61 
1. The statutory objective of both the dormant commerce clause and 
the police power is to protect the general public 
The ultimate objective of both the commerce clause and police 
power (of which regulatory taking is a part) is protection of the public. 
Regulation under the commerce clause protects the national interest,62 
while police power regulation protects local interests. 63 While these ob-
servations might seem self-evident, they are nonetheless useful as a 
point of departure for any evaluation of governmental interference with 
private rights. A loss of focus on the real objective of both powers ham-
pers dormant commerce clause and regulatory taking analysis alike. 
2. Constitutional restrictions bar the state's power to regulate 
The pivotal question in dormant commerce clause analysis is 
whether a state can regulate some activity in interstate commerce when 
Congress has not spoken to the issue. In Wilson v. Black Bird Creek 
60. B. SCHWARTZ, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW: A TEXTBOOK, 125 (2d. ed. 1979); Stoebuck, 
Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WAsH & LEE L. REv. 1057 (1980). 
61. Pike, 397 U.S. at 137; Feiler, supra note 59, at 319. Admitedly, differences between 
these two distinct constitutionally granted powers do exist. First, dormant commerce clause raises 
federalism questions. Regulatory taking concerns only individual rights. Second, the language of 
the dormant commerce clause is implicit-what can the state regulate when Congress has not 
acted-whereas the language of the taking clause is explicit " ... nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation" (U.S. CoNST. amend. V). Finally, unlike regula-
tory taking analysis, the dormant commerce clause analysis includes defined exceptions: Congres-
sional consent, preemption, and market participant. These differences, however, are incidental and 
do not defeat application of dormant commerce clause analysis in taking situations. 
62. Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 
(1851 ). "Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or admit only of one uni-
form system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive 
legislation by Congress." 
63. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962), citing Lawton v. Steele, 
152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894): "To justify the State in ... interposing its authority in behalf of the 
public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public ... require such interference .... " 
Futher, "The ordinance in question was passed as a safety measure, and the town is attempting to 
uphold it on that basis." 369 U.S. at 595. 
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Marsh Co.,64 the Supreme Court held that a state may regulate com-
merce in areas where Congress has not exercised its power as long as 
the regulation does not conflict with the implicit power of the commerce 
clause. A regulation does not conflict with the commerce clause when it 
furthers interests of health and welfare specific to the state, i.e., when 
the state has a legitimate purpose for the regulation.66 However, the 
Supreme Court will not accept at face value a state's contention that it 
is acting for these purposes. Courts may examine evidence to determine 
whether a state's purported interest is real and substantial enough to 
justify police-power regulation.66 Even though a presumption of valid-
ity is given to the state action, this presumption can be overcome by a 
clear showing that the national interest outweighs any state objectives.67 
In comparison, when a state regulation limits use of private land, 
the spectre of regulatory taking tempers state action much like the 
shadow of the dormant commerce clause on unrestricted state regula-
tion of commerce. Two issues arise when a state or local government 
exercises its police powers to regulate land use. The first question is 
whether the regulation has a discernable tendency to serve the public 
health, safety, morals, or welfare ?68 The second question is whether the 
regulation represents a reasonable exercise of police power? That is, do 
the means the local government has chosen to regulate the uses of pri-
vate land fit the stated ends? Similar questions are asked when a state 
is challenged with a violation of the dormant commerce clause. 
Thus, the pivotal question underlying any state land use regula-
tion is whether general welfare demands that certain uses of the land 
be prohibited.89 Justice Harlan stated in Mugler that courts will not 
accept the constitutional validity of a regulatory measure if they are 
satisfied that "its real object is not to protect the community or to pro-
mote the general well being, but, under the guise of police regulation, 
to deprive the owner of his liberty and property, without due process of 
64. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829). 
65. Southern Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc., 303 U.S. 177 
(1938). 
66. See, Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981). 
67. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizonia, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). The Arizona Train Limit Law 
imposed restrictions on the number of cars permitted on any train operating within the state. 
Arizona sued Southern Pacific, an interstate carrier, for violation of the statute. Southern Pacific 
defended on the grounds that the statute unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce. The 
trial court made extensive findings of fact and concluded that any possible safety benefits of the 
law were outweighed by increased hazards. The law imposed unconsitituional burdens on inter-
state commerce and was void. 
68. Anderson, supra, note 20 at § 2.19 at 80. 
69. E.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Villiage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 
272 U.S. 365 (1926); Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 590. 
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law."7° Courts may examine evidence to determine whether the state's 
interest is real and substantial. Even though today's courts tend to re-
ject Harlan's search for legislative motive,71 they still claim judical re-
sponsibility for assessing the reasonableness of the effect of a regulatory 
measure. 72 
3. Standards to measure the constitutionality of state action 
The Pike test is a balancing test skewed toward the legislature. 
The problems with the regulatory takings test13 could be remedied if 
the Supreme Court would employ the Pike test in regulatory takings 
situations. 
The three-prong test of Pike can be restated to reflect regulatory 
taking issues as follows: 1) does the taking of private property in this 
instance advance a legitimate state objective; 2) is the land use regula-
tion related to the legitimate state objective; and 3) is the regulatory 
burden on the landowner disproportionately great compared to the bur-
den the municipality would bear by not regulating the landowner's 
use? 
a. A legitimate state objective 
The first prong of the Pike analysis as applied in the regulatory 
takings context asks whether the taking of private property advances a 
legitimate state objective. "Legitimate-objective" issues in the land-use 
context ask whether a regulation is valid insofar as it affects a particu-
lar piece of land ?74 Rather than challenge the decision to regulate, the 
landowner challenges the specific application of a particular statute or 
regulation to his land. 
In Nectow v. City of Cambridge/" the Supreme Court invalidated 
a residential zoning classification as it applied to a parcel of land.76 
70. Mugler 123 U.S. at 669. 
71. E.g., Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles, 161 Cal. App. 2d 454, 464, 327 P.2d 10, 16 
(1958) " ... [T]he motives which influence a legislative body in passing an ordinance which is 
within its power to pass may not be inquired into .... " 
72. See e.g., Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. Margate City, 112 N.J. Super. 341, 271 A.2d 430, 
432-33 (1970). 
73. See, nr1. 32-53 and accompanying text. 
74. Feiler, supra note 59, at 326-34. A second inquiry would be whether the regulation as a 
whole is invalid. This inquiry involves both equal protection and substantive due process ques-
tions. Because this comment has not dealt with these problems, the inquiry will not be explored 
futher. For a detailed discussion on equal protection and substantive due process. /d. 
75. 277 u.s. 183 (1929). 
7 6. When the zoning ordinance was enacted, the plan tiff owned a tract of land containing 
140,000 square feet. The parcel of land at issue consisted of 29,000 square feet. This land was 
zoned residental while all the land around it was industrial. Because of the zoning, a purchaser 
refused to comply with his contract to buy the land. /d. at 186-87. Compare, Grand Trunk West-
ern R. Co. v. Detroit, 326 Mich. 387, 40 N.W.2d 195 (1949) (a zoning restriction limited a 
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The validity of the zoning ordinance was not challenged, but the ordi-
nance's application to a particular portion of land was. The ordinance 
was held invalid based on a determination that the land was unsuited 
for residential use because of its industrial surroundings. The Nectow 
majority held that the regulations impact on the landowner was not 
inspired by a desire to benefit the public health, safety, morals, or gen-
eral welfare. 77 The Court in Nectow found that the "necessary basis" 
for the regulation was wanting.78 
Thus, a zoning regulation can be invalidated because its effect on 
specific land has severely reduced the land's use value while providing 
marginal benefit to the community. Such a regulation furthers no legiti-
mate municiple interest because it makes little or no contribution to the 
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. 
A comparable claim to Nectow is the claim that the landowner's 
proposed use bears a direct relation to the general welfare but the mu-
nicipality's regulation does not. Typically, this claim is raised by instu-
tional landowners who wish to use their property for schools, churches, 
hospitals or other charitable uses, but are hindered by the municipal-
ity's exclusion of the use. 79 
This claim is alluded to in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co. 80 "It is not meant by this however [in sustaining the zoning restric-
tion], to exclude the possibility of cases where the general public inter-
est would so far outweigh the interest of the municipality that the mu-
nicipality would not be allowed to stand in the way."81 Albeit this 
claim deals mostly with recognized public service institutions, it is no 
less applicable to private landowners who show a substantial relation 
between their proposed use and a benefit to society.82 
b. A rational relation between the state objective and the 
regulation 
The second prong of the reformulated Pike test asks whether there 
exists a substantial relation between a state's objective and the means 
chosen to achieve that objective. If a regulatory objective is valid on its 
district 95 percent developed for industrial and other nonresidential uses to multiple-family 
dwellings). 
77. Nectow, 277 U.S. at 187-88. 
78. /d. at 189. 
79. E.g., Andrews v. Board of Adjustment of the Township of Ocean, 30 N.J. 245, 152 A.2d 
580 (1959) (finding a need for parochial schools in the community and stating that the education 
of children directly futhers the general welfare). 
80. 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926). 
81. /d. 
82. E.g., National Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1966) (the 
regulation specifying a minimum lot size were held invalid in view of individuals living outside the 
community who wanted to build homes on these lots and immigrate into the community). 
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face-within the police power-and the regulation furthers the state 
objective, it will be held valid. But, if the regulation only slightly serves 
the objective, a court may disapprove the regulation even if it is valid 
on its face. The Illinois courts, which process a large number of regula-
tory-zoning cases,83 have recognized the importance of this distinction 
in the takings context. These courts frequently hold that a land-use 
ordinance "must have a real substantial relation to the public health, 
safety, morals or general welfare. If the gain to the public is slight and 
the loss to the individual property owner is substantial, the regulation 
is not a proper exercise of the police power and is consequently inva-
lid."8' Stated succinctly, a land-use regulation, in order to be valid, 
must bear some relation to a legitimate state objective, and cannot be 
sustained unless it bears such a relation. 
c. Does the incidental burden rest with the state or the 
landowner? 
The final prong of the reformulated Pike test considers whether 
the landowner's burden is disproportionately great compared to the 
burden on the municipality. Regulations imposing severe limitations on 
private land have been upheld when they substantially advanced a pub-
lic interest lying neatly within the police power. 
In Miller v. Schoene, 811 a Virginia statute requiried the destruction 
of ornamental red cedar trees that were or could be the source of a 
communicable plant disease called "cedar rust." The disease destroyed 
the fruit and foliage of apple trees without affecting the cedars. The 
cedar trees, unlike apple trees, were not cultivated commercially on any 
substantial scale; their value was shown to be small compared to that of 
the state's apple orchards. The Supreme Court held that the cedar tree 
owner's burden was incidental compared to the burden on the state.86 
The Supreme Court held that "[ t]he only practicable method of con-
trolling the disease" was the destruction of the trees. 87 In the view of 
the Court, there existed only two alternatives-destruction of the cedars 
or destruction of the apple orchards by cedar rust. However, had the 
treatment been available, a less burdensome solution to the problem in 
83. Anderson, supra note 20, at 81. 
84. Langguth v. Village of Mount Prospect, 5 Ill. 2d 49, 54, 124 N.E.2d 879, 881 (1955). 
See also, containing similar statements: Tillitson v. Urbana, 29 Ill. 2d 22, 193 N.E.2d 1 (1963); 
Franz v. Morton Grove, 28 Ill.2d 246, 190 N.E.2d 790 (1963); Weitling v. Du Page, 26 Ill. 2d 
196, 186 N.E.2d 291 (1962); Gregory v. Wheaton, 23 Ill. 2d 402, 178 N.E.2d 358 (1961). Com-
pare, San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981 ). 
85. 276 U.S. 272 (1928). 
86. No compensation was allowed by the statute for the value of the trees standing or for the 
decrease in the market value of the cedar tree owner's land. /d. at 277. 
87. Schoene, 276 U.S. at 278. 
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Schoene would have simply been to require the state to spray for cedar 
rust. Both alternatives (destruction of the trees and spraying the trees) 
satisfy the same objective; however, requiring the state to spray would 
have relieved cedar owners of a heavy economic burden. The state, on 
the other hand, could have spread the cost of spraying among many 
people. 
(1). Less burdensome alternatives are a means of determining 
who carries the burden. The theory of less burdensome alternatives is 
equated most often with a dormant commerce clause case decided in 
1951: Dean Milk Co. v. Madison. 88 However, even before Dean Milk, 
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in 1943, used a less-burden-
some-alternative test in the regulatory takings context. 
In Willis v. Wilkins, 89 the New Hampshire court held that a reg-
ulation prohibiting bathing and swimming in a lake constituted an un-
reasonable impairment of riparian owners' right to a benefical use of 
the lake. The town of Pembroke, members of the Board of Health, and 
members of the Board of Water Commissioners alleged the town's pub-
lic water supply, obtained from the lake, was in danger of contamina-
tion. They requested an amendment to the existing regulations to pro-
hibit any bathing or swimming in any part of the lake. 
After the court reviewed the public-health objectives it found that 
prohibiting bathing and swimming was not the only antipollution 
method available. There was evidence that lowering the intake of the 
water system of the lake to a depth of twenty feet would be a near-
perfect safeguard against summer pollution. Chlorination would also 
render the water practically sterile. Both methods were shown to be 
moderate in cost. 
Plantiffs then offered evidence that the market value of their land 
would be reduced from fifty to seventy-five percent if the regulations 
were amended. After balancing the state's objective against the regula-
tion's restrictive effect, the New Hampshire court decided that the addi-
tional public cost of lowering the depth of the water at the intake of the 
lake or of chlorinating the water was slight in comparision to the ripa-
rian owner's private loss. 
Thus, the less-burdensome-alternative theory suggests that when-
ever the reasonableness and fairness of a regulation are at issue, the 
availability or unavailability of alternative methods is germane. Justice 
Frankfurter, in Shelton v. Tucker90 stated, "[t]he issue remains, 
whether in the light of the particular kind of restriction upon individual 
88. 340 u.s. 349 (1951). 
89. 92 N.H. 400, 32 A.2d 321 (1943). 
90. 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (dissenting opinion). 
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liberty which a regulation entails, [is it) reasonable for a legislature to 
choose that form of regulation rather than others less restrictive."91 
(2). Less-burdensome-alternatives analysis refines the balancing 
test. Using the less-burdensome-alternative approach does not deprive 
the state of its regulatory objective. It simply reaches the objective with-
out affecting the private individual to the same extent as would the 
regulation in controversy. 
Before deciding whether the challenged regulation is so onerous 
that it constitutes a taking, courts should test the regulation under the 
less-burdensome-alternative princi pie. In Gold batt, Justice Clark 
pointed out two separate tests for measuring a regulation's validity. 
First, a regulation "cannot be so onerous as to constitute a taking;"92 
and second, a regulation must be "reasonably necessary for the accom-
plishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individu-
als. " 93 The second test implies at least a less-burdensome-alternative 
standard. 
In addition, the courts must decide whether the less burdensome 
alternative is equally effective. Usually the alternative is less burden-
some on the landowner but more burdensome for the municipality. 
When this is the case, the courts revert to a balancing test and value 
judgment as to where the burden should rest. 
When the less-burdensome-alternative test fails to demonstrate 
that a satisfactory alternative is available, the courts in effect have bal-
anced the governmental purpose with the interests affected and have 
found those interests lacking. Consistent application of the less-burden-
some-alternative principle would greatly assist sound balancing by 
sharpening the courts' awareness of the facts and the conflicting 
interests. 94 
V. CONCLUSION 
Dealing with regulatory-takings issues has proven troublesome. 
Traditional takings tests and the present balancing test found in Penn 
Central have done nothing to alleviate the problems which arise when 
dealing with this constitutional doctrine. The numerous problems cre-
ated by urbanization demand that the courts address the takings prob-
lem and formulate a workable test. Municipalities and landowners 
need to know what constitutes a valid regulation or an unconstitutional 
91. /d. at 494. 
92. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). 
93. /d. at 595 (quoting Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894)). 
94. See generally, Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle and Economic Due 
Process, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1463 (1967). 
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regulatory taking. By adopting dormant commerce clause analysis, the 
courts have at their disposal an established and respected test. Pike's 
three standards for measuring the constitutionality of state action 
equally applies in regulatory takings cases because it asks three funda-
mental questions: Is there a legitimate state objective in regulating; is 
the regulation rationally related to the state's objective; and is the bur-
den of the regulation incidental? These standards provide the courts 
with a guideline which leads to clear and consistent decisions. The 
adoption of dormant commerce clause analysis in regulatory takings 
cases will enable courts to easily and efficiently deal with these issues. 
Julie A. Sturgill 
